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SEELEY v. STATE: THE NEED FOR DEFINITIONAL
BALANCING IN WASHINGTON SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS LAW
Kristiana L. Farris
Abstract: Seeley v. State, concerning the medical use of marijuana, underscored yet again
the fundamental tensions and flaws in federal substantive due process analysis. The U.S.
Supreme Court has increasingly restricted the definition of fundamental rights, leaving many
important interests exposed to the highly deferential rational relationship standard for state
regulation. Under the bifurcated federal substantive due process test, the initial classification
of an individual interest as fundamental or non-fundamental is highly outcome determinative,
leading to contorted definitions of individual rights before the test for the validity of a
regulation is even applied. Washington has generally followed federal constitutional law
when analyzing due process issues. This Note argues that Seeley v. State presented the
Supreme Court of Washington with an opportunity to depart finally from the flawed federal
analysis and adopt a substantive due process test that is better gauged to the importance of the
individual interest at stake. In conclusion, the Note proposes a definitional balancing test that
accords varying levels of protection to different rights depending upon the importance of the
individual interest.

Smoking marijuana was the only effective way for Ralph Seeley to
ease the debilitating side-effects of his chemotherapy treatment.
Nevertheless, in Seeley v. State, the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed the State's refusal to allow doctors to prescribe leaf marijuana,
even for patients undergoing chemotherapy for terminal cancer.' The
Seeley majority held that Mr. Seeley's interest was not a fundamental
right, and following the federal constitutional analysis, applied the
rational relationship test to Mr. Seeley's equal protection and substantive
due process claims.2 The majority found that the placement of marijuana
on Schedule I of controlled substances 3 was rationally related to the state
1. 132 Wash. 2d 776,814,940 P.2d 604, 623 (1997).
2. Id., 940 P.2d at 622-23. This Note focuses on the substantive due process claim.
3. Under the Washington Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which parallels the federal
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Schedule I drugs are characterized by a
(a) high potential for abuse; (b) lack of currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States; and (c) lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under medical supervision. 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(b)(1) (1997); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.203 (1997). Schedule II drugs meet similar criteria,
except they are deemed to have a currently-accepted medical use or a currently-accepted medical use
with severe restriction. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2) (1997); Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.205 (1997).
Schedule III, IV, and V substances have qualities similar to those on Schedule II, but have
decreasing potential for abuse. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(3)-(5) (1997); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 69.50.209.211 (1997). Schedule I substances are illegal under all circumstances except research. Seeley, 132
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interests of preventing drug abuse and protecting the public from
unproved medications.' In his dissent, Justice Sanders conceded the
equal protection issue, but argued that the substantive due process claim
should be analyzed under the balancing test used in land use regulation
challenges, rather than under the rigid federal rational relationship test.'
Applying a balancing approach, Justice Sanders would have held that the
placement of marijuana on Schedule I of controlled substances violated
Mr. Seeley's substantive due process rights.6
This Note argues that although the Seeley majority correctly applied
Washington precedent in holding that Washington's substantive due
process analysis is equivalent to the federal due process test, the federal
substantive due process test is flawed. Seeley v. State posed an
opportunity for Washington courts to depart from the federal substantive
due process analysis and adopt a different test that would be more
responsive to the importance of the individual interests at stake.
Part I of this Note outlines the U.S. Supreme Court's test for
evaluating substantive due process challenges to state actions. Part II
summarizes Washington's substantive due process law. Part III describes
the background, holding, and Justice Sanders's dissent in Seeley v. State.
Part IV explains why Seeley comports with Washington precedent and
criticizes both the federal and Washington approaches to substantive due
process. This Note suggests that Washington should adopt a definitional
balancing test that weighs individual and state interests before defining a
rule. Finally, Part V concludes that the Washington court would have
found in favor of Mr. Seeley under a definitional balancing analysis.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Washington v. Glucksberg,7 the latest U.S. Supreme Court case to
address substantive due process, reasserted the Court's commitment to
the bifurcated fundamental rights analysis as the sole substantive due
process test. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,8 Cruzan v. Director of
Wash. 2d at 782-83, 940 P.2d at 607. One can legally possess substances on Schedules II through V
with a valid prescription. Id.
4. Id. at 813, 940 P.2d at 622.
5. Id. at 814-15, 819, 940 P.2d at 623, 625 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 833-34, 940 P.2d at 632 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
7. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
8. 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)) ("Due process has not been reduced to any
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Missouri Department of Health,9 Youngberg v. Romeo,"° and Roe v.
Wade," the Court explicitly incorporated the balancing of individual and
state interests into the due process analysis. 2 However, when the Court
revisited the substantive due process issue in Glucksberg, it rejected any
balancing approach and reaffirmed a more restrictive definition of
fundamental rights. 3
A.

The Due Process Clause and Its BifurcatedAnalysis

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o
person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."' 4 Originally, the federal courts interpreted the Due
Process Clause primarily as a restriction on governmental procedures
used to deprive persons of life, liberty, and property. 5 By the 1890s,
however, courts began reading a substantive component into the clause,
requiring that these deprivations be supported by some legitimate

formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that
through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society.").
9. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (quoting Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) ("But
determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process Clause does not end the
inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests."').
10. 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (in
determining whether substantive right protected by Due Process Clause has been violated, it is
necessary to balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an organized society").
11. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (weighing woman's privacy interest in abortion against state interest
in protecting life to determine at what point state interest becomes sufficient to constitute compelling
interest).
12. These cases balance individual and state interests in determining whether there has been a
substantive due process violation. This is unusual because the two-tiered rational relationship test, as
it is normally used, does not incorporate a balancing of interests. Rather, strict scrutiny requires a
showing of a compelling state interest to which the regulation is narrowly tailored, while rational
relationship merely requires that there be any state interest to which a regulation is rationally related.
Balancing interests makes the rational relationship test more protective of individual rights because it
demands more than just a showing of a state interest-it requires the state interest to outweigh the
individual interest.
13. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2268 (1997).
14. U.S. Const. amend. V; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("Nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... . ').
15. See, eg., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272,276-77 (1855)
(construing Due Process Clause strictly in terms of fairness of proceedings).
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justification.1 6 The notion that courts may hold certain state actions
unconstitutional, regardless of the validity of the procedures by which
they are executed, is now firmly rooted in constitutional law. 7
The Supreme Court has developed a bifurcated framework for
substantive due process analysis." If a regulation infringes on a
fundamental right, the action is unconstitutional unless it passes the strict
scrutiny test.'9 Conversely, if the state action affects a non-fundamental
individual interest, regulation impairing that interest need only be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest to withstand review.2"
1.

The RationalRelationship Test

Interests not considered fundamental are subjected to the rational
relationship test.2 This extremely deferential level of review very rarely
leads to invalidation of state actions.' Under this test, government
infringement of the interest need only be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest in order to withstand review.' In finding a rationally related
government interest, courts may consider any conceivable state of facts,
including those not actually considered by the legislature. 24 Even

"rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data"
satisfies the rational basis criteria.'

16. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 625,
626 (1992).
17. Id. This notion is referred to as "substantive due process," as opposed to "procedural due
process."
18. One of the earliest uses of this substantive due process framework can be found in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (finding that state ban on marine insurance policies issued by
out-of-state companies violates substantive due process).
19. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
20. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997).
21. Id. at 2271-72.
22. See Galloway, supra note 16, at 645 ("[R]ationality review is usually a mere formality leading
to the automatic conclusion that the government action is constitutional ...
23. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
24. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,490-91 (1955).
25. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,315 (1993).
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2.

The StrictScrutiny Test

When an interest is deemed a fundamental right, any state action
directly impeding that right is subjected to the strict scrutiny test.26 Under
this test, the law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.27 Statutes infringing on fundamental rights are given a strong
presumption of unconstitutionality2" and are often invalidated.29
B.

Determining Which InterestsAre Fundamental

In its most recent substantive due process case, Washington v.
Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its narrow interpretation
of fundamental rights.3 ° Generally, fundamental rights are individual
interests so important that any state action impeding those interests will
receive the highest level of scrutiny. In defining which rights are
fundamental, the Supreme Court has recently taken a narrow view.
Noting that it has "always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process,"' the Court restricted fundamental rights to
those "which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."' 32 This represents a retreat from the previous three decades,
during which the Court had articulated a broader view.33
26. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
27. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268; Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Galloway, supra note 16, at 638.
See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
117 S. Ct. 2258.
Id. at 2267 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).

32. Id. at 2268 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion)).
33. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973) (recognizing that right to physicianassisted abortion is within fundamental right of personal privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (recognizing marriage as fundamental right and invalidating statute prohibiting interracial
marriage on equal protection grounds); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(holding that marital privacy is within zone of privacy that is fundamental right). Justice Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), is a common source of reasoning for many of these
expansions of rights. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992); Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 340-41 (1990); Roe, 410 U.S. at 169;
Griswold,381 U.S. at 484. In Poe, Justice Harlan explained that "it is not the particular enumeration
of rights in the first eight Amendments which spells out the reach of Fourteenth Amendment due
process, but rather... a discrete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty of liberty and
procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific prohibitions [of the Constitution]."
367 U.S. at 541-42 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But he carefully tied any implied rights to history and
tradition. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court
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Recognized fundamental rights include marriage,3 4 marital privacy,35
use of contraception, bodily integrity, and abortion. 8 The Supreme
Court has also declared that the individual interests in having children39
and directing the education of one's children40 are fundamental rights.

Most interests fall to rise to the level of fundamental rights. The Court
has held that working, 4' running for political office,42 obtaining welfare,43
and receiving a public education' are not fundamental rights. 45 In
controversial cases the Court has refused to grant fundamental right

which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has
survived is likely to be sound."); see also Anthony C. Cicia, A WolfIn Sheep's Clothing?:A Critical
Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2241,
2247-48 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
35. See, e.g., Griswold,381 U.S. at 485-86.
36. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1972) (holding that Massachusetts law
prohibiting non-married persons from obtaining contraceptives "conflicted with fundamental human
right').
37. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-70 (1952) (holding that forced stomach
pumping of suspected narcotics dealer violated substantive due process).
38. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973) (legalizing abortion until fetal viability
and whenever necessary to protect health of mother).
39. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (recognizing
that fundamental rights were violated by forced sterilization of prisoner).
40. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that Compulsory
Education Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with liberty of parents and guardians to direct
upbringing and education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923)
(invalidating state law prohibiting any language but English from being spoken in schools because
there are "certain fundamental rights which must be respected").
41. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (recognizing no
fundamental right to governmental employment).
42. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982).
43. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (upholding Maryland regulation
limiting family welfare benefits).
44. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1973).
45. Debates continue among scholars regarding whether fundamental rights should be limited to
those enumerated in the Constitution or could be expanded to embrace rights implied by more
generalized conceptions of liberty. See, e.g., David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover
UnenumeratedFundamentalRights? Cataloguingthe Methods ofJudicialAlchemy, 19 Harv. 3. L. &
Pub. Pol'y 795 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989).
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status to privacy in homosexual relations46 and the power to determine
the time and manner of one's death.47
C.

The Classificationof an AssertedInterest Often Determines the
Outcome Under the BifurcatedFramework

Under federal substantive due process analysis, the classification of an
interest as fundamental or non-fundamental has proven to be critical to
the outcome. When subjected to the rational basis test, state actions
infringing upon non-fundamental individual interests are almost always
affirmed. State actions upheld under rational basis review include
statutes banning homosexual sodomy,48 banning plastic nonreturnable
milk containers,4 9 and mandating that state police officers retire at the
age of fifty.50 State actions have been invalidated under rational basis
review in very few cases."' Conversely, there are few cases in which the
state regulation has been upheld under strict scrutiny analysis.52 State
actions that have been nullified include statutes forbidding interracial
marriage, 3 use of contraception, 4 abortion, 5 and the teaching of modem

46. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding state ban on homosexual
sodomy).
47. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2274-75 (1997) (upholding state ban on
physician-assisted suicide).
48. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding beliefs about morality of homosexuality served
sufficient rational basis for law criminalizing sodomy even in privacy of home).
49. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1981). Although CloverLeaf
was an equal protection case, the Court applied a rational relationship test identical to that applied in
substantive due process cases.
50. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). Murgia was also
decided on equal protection grounds.
51. See Galloway, supra note 16, at 627. Few cases have invalidated legislation under rational
basis review. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343-46
(1989) (holding that taxing property at 50% of its value violated equal protection); Hooper v.
Bemalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623-24 (1985) (holding that Vietnam veterans' tax
exemption violated equal protection).
52. See Galloway, supra note 16, at 638 ("Government infringements of fundamental rights are
normally subject to a strong presumption of unconstitutionality."). Very few cases uphold regulation
subjected to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1992) (upholding
prohibition of campaigning within 100 feet of polling place entrance on election day against First
Amendment free speech challenge); Webster v. Reproduction Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521
(1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding state restriction on use of public employees and facilities for
nontherapeutic abortions).
53. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down statute on equal protection

grounds).
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languages other than English in public and private schools.5 6 Thus,

classification of interests as fundamental or non-fundamental is critical.
D.

Deviationsfrom the BifurcatedTest

The Supreme Court, recognizing that liberty cannot be shoehorned
into discrete categories, suggested replacing or supplementing the twotiered approach to due process with a balancing element in some cases.57
Dissenting in Poe v. Ullman,58 Justice Harlan proposed such balancing.
His dissent was later cited with approval in Griswold v. Connecticut 9
60
and PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.
At times, courts have viewed the use of a balancing test as indicative
of a future shift in due process analysis.6 ' Any expectations that federal
courts would commit to a more liberal balancing test were disappointed,
however, when in Washington v. Glucksberg62 the Supreme Court
reversed Compassion in Dying v. Washington,63 rejecting a "complex
balancing of competing interests" as an element of due process

54. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding marital privacy is within
fundamental right of privacy).
55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973).
56. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401-02 (1923).
57. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849-50, 876 (1992) (citing with approval
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
advocating balance between individual liberty and state interest, then outlining rule that state may
not place undue burden on woman's ability to obtain abortion); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept.
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982), for
substantive due process test "whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests"); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (balancing individual liberty interest against state interest before determining
when state's interest becomes sufficiently compelling to overcome strict scrutiny).
58. 367 U.S. at 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. 381 U.S. at 484 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 516-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting), for the proposition
that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance").
60. 505 U.S. at 850 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting), for the proposition that
due process "has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society").
61. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (viewing Casey
and Cruzan as signaling turn toward more liberal balancing test for substantive due process).
62. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
63. 79 F.3d 790.
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analysis.' 4 The Court reaffirmed the use of the bifurcated fundamental
rights based test and committed itself to a more restrictive approach to
categorizing asserted interests as fundamental."
II.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN WASHINGTON

Washington generally has followed the federal bifurcated substantive
due process analysis.' However, the courts have departed occasionally
from the federal law.
In challenges to land use regulation, Washington courts have deviated

from the federal substantive due process law by applying a test for
substantive due process challenges that has been abandoned by the
federal courts.67 The Lawton v. Steele 8 test, as adopted by Washington

64. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct 2258, 2268 n.17 (1997) ("[A]lthough Justice Harlan's
opinion has often been cited in due-process cases, we have never abandoned our fundamental-rightsbased analytical method.... True, the Court relied on Justice Harlan's dissent in
Casey... but.., we did not in so doing jettison our established approach.").
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., State v. Manusier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 679-82, 921 P.2d 473, 486-88 (1996)
(rejecting substantive and procedural due process challenges to "three strikes law"). For cases citing
federal precedent, see, for example, Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wash. 2d 277, 293, 892 P.2d 1067,
1076 (1994); State v. Wheeler, 95 Wash. 2d 799, 803-04, 631 P.2d 376, 379 (1981). For cases
employing strict scrutiny or rational basis tests, see, for example, In re Dependency of C.B., 79
Wash. App. 686, 689-90,904 P.2d 1171, 1174 (1995); State v. Luther, 65 Wash. App. 424,427-28,
830 P.2d 674,675-76 (1992); and City of Seattle v. Larkin, 10 Wash. App. 205, 208, 516 P.2d 1083,
1085 (1973).
67. See, e.g., Rivett v. City of Tacoma, 123 Wash. 2d 573, 581, 585, 870 P.2d 299, 303, 305
(1994) (holding that city ordinance imposing liability upon abutting property owners for condition of
sidewalks and indemnifying city for judgments arising out of negligent maintenance of sidewalks
violated due process clause of State Constitution); Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 608-09,
614, 854 P.2d 1, 13-14, 16-17 (1993) (invalidating statute requiring landowners to provide
monetary assistance for tenant relocation costs); Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d
320, 330-31, 338-40, 787 P.2d 907, 912-13, 917-18 (1990) (refusing to invalidate land use
regulation prohibiting development of portion of undivided parcel of real property); Orion Corp. v.
State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 646-48, 673, 747 P.2d 1062, 1076-78, 1089 (1987) (upholding Shoreline
Management Act and Skagit County Shoreline Management Master Program against wetlands owner
challenge). The Lawton test, upon which these cases are based, has been effectively abandoned by
the federal courts. See infra note 68.
68. 152 U.S. 133 (1894). This case pre-dates the U.S. Supreme Court's 1897 adoption of the
bifurcated substantive due process test. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme
Court has only entertained one substantive due process challenge to land use regulations since
Lavton: Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In the federal courts, the Lawton test
has not survived the rejection of the Lochner Era line of cases. Instead, the federal courts have
analyzed challenges to land use regulations almost exclusively under a takings analysis. Paul J.
Boudreaux, The QuintessentialBest Casefor "Takings" Compensation-A PragmaticApproach to
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courts, uses a three-pronged analysis. In determining whether a
regulation violates due process, the court asks "(1) whether the
regulation is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether
it uses means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose; and
(3) whether it is unduly oppressive on the land owner."'69 The "unduly
oppressive" inquiry lodges wide discretion in the court to contravene
legislative prerogative and requires a balancing of the public interest
against that of the land owner.7' This test has resulted in the invalidation
of several land use regulations. 1 Similarly, in free exercise of religion
challenges to land use regulations, Washington courts have departed
willingly from the federal analysis and foregone deferring to the
legislature in favor of extending greater protection to individual
*
72
interests.

In addition to cases involving property, at least one Washington court
of appeals has expressed general dissatisfaction with the bifurcated
federal substantive due process analysis. In City of Seattle v.
McConahy,73 a Washington appellate court found the Ninth Circuit's
Identifying the Elements of Land Use Regulations that Present the Best Case for Government
Compensation,34 San Diego L. Rev. 193, 224 (1997).
69. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 609, 854 P.2d at 114. In a recent case, Justice Sanders, writing for
the majority, applied an "arbitrary or irrational" test, finding that a land use action violated
substantive due process. Mission Springs v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 970, 954 P.2d 250,
261 (1998). As Justice Talmadge noted in his dissent, this was an unexplained departure by the
majority from the established three-part Lawton test for substantive due process challenges to land
use regulations. Id. at 988-89, 954 P.2d at 270-71 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
70. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913.
71. See, e.g., Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 612-13, 854 P.2d at 16-17 (invalidating state law
requiring mobile home park owners to contribute toward tenants' relocation costs as requiring
owners to bear unfair portion of costs that society as whole should shoulder); Robinson v. City of
Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 55, 830 P.2d 318, 331 (1992) (striking down city ordinance requiring land
owners to provide relocation assistance to tenants displaced when low income housing demolished
as unduly burdensome).
72. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that laws of general applicability burdening a religious
practice do not violate the free exercise clause. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79
(1990). Washington courts, however, have on numerous occasions invalidated land use regulations
on free exercise of religion grounds. See, e.g.,
Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 209-10, 930
P.2d 318, 326 (1997) (striking down city demolition ordinance delaying construction of pastoral
center); First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Exam'r, 129 Wash. 2d 238, 252, 916 P.2d 374,
381 (1996) (invalidating Landmarks Preservation Ordinance preventing church from selling property
and using funds to further religious mission); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d
203, 223, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (1992) (striking designation of church as historic preservation
landmark).
73. 86 Wash. App. 557, 937 P.2d 1133 (1997) (upholding Seattle ordinance prohibiting
individuals from sitting on sidewalks in certain business districts).
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balancing test in Compassion in Dying v. Washington74 consistent with
previous Washington substantive due process law, and observed that "it
contributes a useful approach to due process analysis because it creates a
more workable balance among the competing interests presented in cases
' Three weeks later,
like this one than does the traditional balancing test."75
however, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Compassion in Dying.76 The
next due process case to arise in Washington was Seeley v. State.77
III. SEELEY V. STATE
A.

Factsand ProceduralHistory

Ralph Seeley, diagnosed with a rare and terminal form of bone cancer
in 1986, endured many surgeries including the removal of his right lung
and part of his left lung. 78 After trying numerous prescription drugs to
curb the painful side effects of radiation therapy and chemotherapy, Mr.
Seeley found that only one treatment effectively relieved him of his pain,
nausea, and vomiting: smoking leaf marijuana.79 Mr. Seeley's doctor
testified that leaf marijuana provided the most effective therapy for Mr.
Seeley's symptoms, and that he would have prescribed it for Mr. Seeley
if he legally could have done so. 0
In 1994, Mr. Seeley filed a pro se lawsuit against the State of
Washington, requesting a declaratory judgment that the placement of
marijuana on Schedule I of controlled substances was unconstitutional
under article I, sections 12 and 32 of the Washington State
Constitution.8 Mr. Seeley also sought an order directing the board of
pharmacy to reclassify marijuana so physicians could prescribe it for
patients with a legitimate medical need.82 The Pierce County Superior
Court granted Mr. Seeley's motion for summary judgment, declaring that
74. 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996).
75. McConahy, 86 Wash. App. at 565, 937 P.2d at 1138, The court failed to define the "traditional
balancing test" for substantive due process in Washington, but implied that a balancing of interests
has always been appropriate in substantive due process analysis.
76. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
77. 132 Wash. 2d 776, 940 P.2d 604 (1997).
78. Id. at 781,940 P.2d at 606.
79. Id. at 782, 940 P.2d at 607.
80. Id. at 801,940 P.2d at 617.
81. Id. at 785, 940 P.2d at 608.
82. Id.
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the placement of marijuana on Schedule I violated his rights and liberties
as protected by the Washington State Constitution.13 The State of
Washington directly appealed from this judgment, and the Supreme

Court of Washington granted review."
B.

HoldingandAnalysis

The Supreme Court of Washington, in an eight-to-one opinion,
reversed the superior court and upheld the placement of marijuana on
Schedule 1.85 The Seeley majority analyzed the case primarily under the
Washington Equal protection clause.8 6 The court noted, however, that
"under both an equal protection and a due process challenge the analysis
and the result are the same."87
1.

The Right to Use MarjuanaIs Not Fundamental

Citing cases addressing recreational, rather than medicinal use of
marijuana, the Seeley majority concluded that "the right to smoke
marijuana" is not fundamental.88 The majority also determined that

although refusal of treatment is a protected right, "[t]he selection of a
particular treatment, or at least a medication, is within the area of
governmental interest in protecting public health."8 9 After deciding that
Id.; see Wash. Const. art. I, §§ 12, 32.
Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 785, 940 P.2d at 608- 09.
Id. at 814, 940 P.2d at 623.
Id. at 808 n.20, 940 P.2d at 619-20 n.20; see Wash. Const. art. I, § 32.
87. Id. (citing NORML v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 134 (D.D.C. 1980)).
83.
84.
85.
86.

88. Id. at 792, 940 P.2d at 612 (citing State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869 (1980)
(involving possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana)). Every case the majority cites in support
of the proposition that "the right to smoke marijuana" is not fundamental involved recreationaluse
of marijuana or possession of marijuana with intent to sell. None of the cases cited address directly
medicinal use. The court cites Bell, 488 F. Supp. at 143 (refusing to adopt proposal invalidating
Controlled Substances Act and advocating that marijuana be available for any purpose); State v.
Anonymous, 355 A.2d 729, 731, 742 (Conn. 1976) (holding that, although possession of marijuana
is not fundamental, classification of marijuana with dangerous psychoactive drugs amphetamines
and barbiturates for penalty purposes is irrational and thus violative of equal protection); Kreisher v.
State, 319 A.2d 31, 33 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (upholding conviction for possession and sale of
marijuana and hashish); Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 906 (Mass. 1969) (upholding
conviction for possession of marijuana and for conspiracy to violate Narcotic Drugs Act); and
People v. Alexander, 223 N.W.2d 750, 752-53 (Mich. Ct App. 1974) (upholding conviction for
unlawful delivery of marijuana).
89. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 792, 940 P.2d at 612 (quoting Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d
455, 457 (10th Cir. 1979)) (upholding federal prevention of laetrile use by cancer patients).
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Mr. Seeley's interest in accessing medicinal marijuana did not constitute
a fundamental right, the majority applied the rational basis test."
2.

RationalBasis Test in Equal Protection

While substantive due process jurisprudence deals with state
infringement on individual rights, the principle of equal protection
concerns government classification of citizens for differential treatment.
Both bodies of law employ a form of rational basis review. Under the
equal protection rational basis test, "the legislation will be upheld unless
the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of a legitimate state objective."'" The Seeley majority held that:
The party challenging the legislation 'must show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that no state of facts exists or can be conceived
sufficient to justify the challenged classification, or that the facts
have so far changed as to render the classification arbitrary and
obsolete.' 92
As in rational basis due process analysis, the state action survives if it
can be justified by the thinnest thread of a legitimate state interest.
The State asserted a dual interest in controlling potential drug abuse
and assuring efficacy and safety in medicines,93 which the majority
assumed to be legitimate.94 Noting that other narcotics, such as cocaine,
morphine, and methamphetamines, are omitted from Schedule I and can
be prescribed by physicians, 95 the court found dispositive the fact that
marijuana had not been similarly approved for medical use, but that a
synthesized form of THC96 in pill form was available.97 While declining
to decide whether marijuana possesses medicinal value, the court
concluded that Mr. Seeley "ha[d] not shown that the legislative treatment

90. Id. at 795, 940 P.2d at 613.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 795-96, 940 P.2d at 613-14 (quoting Smith, 93 Wash. 2d at 337, 610 P.2d at 875).
93. Id. at 800, 940 P.2d at 616.
94. Id. at 805, 940 P.2d at 618.
95. Id. at 806, 940 P.2d at 619.
96. Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinal (THC) is one of the principle active ingredients in marijuana. Id.
at 782, 940 P.2d at 607.
97. Id. at 807, 940 P.2d at 619. The court did not explain how a chemotherapy patient who needs
THC to control nausea and vomiting is expected to ingest a pill and keep it down long enough to
stop the vomiting.
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of marijuana [was] 'so unrelated' to the achievement of the legitimate
purposes of the legislature" as to render the placement of marijuana on
Schedule I unconstitutional.98
C.

Justice Sanders'sDissent

In an impassioned dissent Justice Sanders asserted that equal
protection was the wrong analytical framework to employ in Seeley. He
argued that "the problem is how the government treats Mr. Seeley, not
that Mr. Seeley is treated differently from others. Equalizing injustice
does not cure it."99 Justice Sanders rested his argument upon the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its equivalent in the
Washington State Constitution."0 0 In making a due process argument, he
rejected the majority's use of the rational relationship test in favor of the
balancing test established in Lawton v. Steele."' Justice Sanders asserted
that the Lawton analysis, as adopted by Washington in Orion Corp. v.
State, 0 2 provided the appropriate federal test.'0 3
98. Id. at 805, 940 P.2d at 618. The federal judiciary has not directly decided a substantive due
process challenge to a prohibition on medicinal marijuana. Federal courts have considered
rescheduling marijuana to Schedule 11, but these cases have been decided on statutory, rather than
constitutional grounds. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir.
1994); NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Cases raising constitutional issues, such as
privacy and free exercise of religion, have involved claims that marijuana should be made available
for all uses, including recreation. See Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989); NORML v.
Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NORML v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123 (D.D.C. 1980).
99. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 815, 940 P.2d at 623 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
100. Id. The ACLU raised the due process argument in its amicus brief. Citing Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), the ACLU argued that the classification of
marijuana on Schedule I was a violation of substantive due process right to privacy because the
individual interest outweighed the state interest in regulating the substance. Amicus Brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington Foundation at 12, Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776,
940 P.2d 604 (1997) (No. 63534-0). The State of Washington responded that there was no privacy
interest in access to marijuana and that the classification of marijuana on Schedule I furthered
legitimate State interests. See State of Washington's Answer to American Civil Liberties Union
Amicus Brief at 8, 12, Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776, 940 P.2d 604 (1997) (No. 63534-0). In
stating that the court need not address issues raised solely by an amicus brief unless necessary to
reach a proper decision, the court implied that if it had found the due process issue necessary to the
decision, it would have addressed the issue. See Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 808 n.20, 940 P.2d at 619
n.20.
101. 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 818, 940 P.2d at 625 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
102. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 646-47, 747 P.2d 1062, 1076 (1987); see also Rivett v. City of Tacoma,
123 Wash. 2d 573, 870 P.2d 299 (1994); Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320,
787 P.2d 907 (1990).
103. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 819, 940 P.2d at 625 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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Under the first prong of the Lawton/Orion test-whether the
legislation advances a legitimate public purpose' t ----Justice Sanders
found the state interest in absolutely criminalizing marijuana relatively
minimal." 5 According to the dissent, any state interest in "discouraging
drug abuse and otherwise protecting the citizenry from itself by
curtailing what it alleges to be the unknown consequences associated
is not particularly strong in the context
with the inhalation of marijuana"
06
of terminally ill patients.
Following the second Lawton/Orion prong-whether the means are
reasonably necessary to accomplish the state purpose° 7-- the dissent
characterized the State's total and absolute prohibition of marijuana as
excessive and overly broad.0 In light of the fact that other narcotics are
available through medical prescription, Justice Sanders found the
placement of marijuana on Schedule I anomalous. 9 He concluded that
the availability of leaf marijuana by prescription would represent a better
tailored method by which "the government could accomplish some of its
alleged objectives while making the substance available to those with a
particular medical need."" 0
Under the third Lawton/Orion prong-whether the regulation is
unduly burdensome"'-Justice Sinders found Mr. Seeley's interest in
obtaining palliative relief, like a woman's interest in Roe v. Wade" 2 and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"' to be deeply personal and individual,
implicating notions of personal autonomy and bodily integrity."'
Balancing these vital interests in one's own body against a rather
104. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 646-47, 870 P.2d at 1076.
105. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 820-21, 940 P.2d at 626 (Sanders, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the state's
interest to regulate abortion in the context of Casey and Roe is insufficient, the State's asserted
interest to criminalize Mr. Seeley's ingestion of marijuana to ease the effects of nausea is even
less so.").
106. Id. at 817, 940 P.2d at 624 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
107. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 646-47, 870 P.2d at 1076.
108. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 825, 940 P.2d at 628-29 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 825-26, 940 P.2d at 628-29 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 827, 940 P.2d at 629 (Sanders, J., dissenting). Justice Sanders noted that his decision
here does not preclude the possibility that availability only through prescription may not be
sufficient to overcome the objections raised about the existence of a legitimate state interest raised
under the first prong of the LawtonlOriontest. Id.
11I. Orion, 109 Wash. 2d at 646-47, 870 P.2d at 1076.
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
114. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 821-22, 940 P.2d at 626-27 (Sanders, J., dissenting).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:669, 1998

nebulous state interest, Justice Sanders found Mr. Seeley's interest much
weightier."' He concluded that forcing Mr. Seeley to endure the nausea
without the palliative relief of leaf marijuana
and pain of chemotherapy
1' 6
oppressive.
was unduly
Justice Sanders criticized the majority's use of the rational
relationship test's "extremely deferential standard.""' 7 As he noted,
"strict scrutiny is virtually impossible to pass while rational basis is
virtually impossible to fail."". The bifurcated classification analysis used
by the majority was problematic because it failed to recognize that
liberty interests lie on a continuum." 9 The dissent argued that the burden
should shift to the government to justify government intervention, rather
than to individuals to demonstrate why they should be free from
excessive regulation. 2 °
IV. THE SEELEY MAJORITY SHOULD HAVE ADOPTED A
DEFINITIONAL BALANCING TEST
The Seeley majority correctly followed Washington substantive due
process precedent; nonetheless, Washington courts remain free at any
point to detach their due process analysis under the Washington
Constitution from the federal test. The bifurcated federal test to which
Washington has traditionally tied its substantive due process law has
several fundamental flaws. Seeley v. State posed an opportunity for the
Supreme Court of Washington to depart from the federal bifurcated
analysis and adopt a test that affords protection from regulation more
proportional to the importance of the individual interest.
A.

The Majority CorrectlyFollowed Washington Precedent

The dissent incorrectly asserted that the Lawton test is the appropriate
federal due process analysis. Lawton v. Steele was decided before the
U.S. Supreme Court adopted the bifurcated strict scrutiny/rational
relationship test. The Court has effectively abandoned Lawton and any

115. Id. at 819-20, 940 P.2d at 624 -25 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 827, 940 P.2d at 629 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 828, 940 P.2d at 630 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
Id. at 829, 940 P.2d at 630 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 830, 940 P.2d at 630 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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application of substantive due process to land use regulations.12 ' If
Washington courts follow federal precedent, then under Washington v.
Glucksberg, the bifurcated test remains the proper analysis." z If one
accepts that Washington's approach does and should mimic the federal
substantive due process analysis, then the majority correctly found
against Mr. Seeley.
B.

Washington is Free to DepartFrom the FederalAnalysis

Under federal law, a state has the "sovereign right to adopt in its own
constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by
the Federal Constitution."' 2 The Washington due process clause and its
federal equivalent have virtually identical wording. Article 1, section 3 of
the Washington State Constitution reads, "[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'24 Although no
significant textual difference exists between the federal and state due
process clauses, this alone does not bar a different interpretation of the
protections afforded under these provisions. 5
Washington courts use an analytic framework to evaluate whether it is
permissible to deviate from the federal constitutional analysis and afford
greater protection under the Washington constitution. 2 6 Referred to as
the Gunwall test, this analysis consists of six non-exclusive factors that
may be considered: (1) textual language; (2) differences in the texts;
(3) constitutional history; (4) pre-existing state law; (5) structural

121. See supranote 68.
122. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
123. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 75 (1980).
124. Wash. Const. art I, § 3. For the equivalent federal provision, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
125. City of Seattle v. Duncan, 44 Wash. App. 735,743,723 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1986). In addition,
the proposition that similarity in words equates to similarity in meaning, thus mandating deference to
the federal interpretation, rests upon two weak assumptions: the U.S. Supreme Court has arrived at a
definitive meaning of the constitutional provisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court never errs in
arriving at this meaning. See G. Alan Tarr, UnderstandingState Constitutions, 65 Temp. L. Rev.
1169 (1992) (criticizing "artificial cannon of construction that identical language in two instruments
should be read identically" and concluding that state courts interpreting identical constitutional
provisions must first determine whether Supreme Court has arrived at true meaning of constitutional
provision, only following Court's interpretation when they conclude it is correct); id. at 1191-92
(quoting David R Keyser, State Constitutionsand Theories of JudicialReview: Some Variations on
a Theme, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1051, 1063 (1985)).
126. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 62-63,720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986).
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differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern. 2 7 Using
this test, the Seeley majority could have departed from the federal
substantive due process analysis.
Although the first factor-textual language-is identical in the two
constitutions, 28 the other Gunwall factors support more extensive due
process protections under the state constitution. Under the second
Gunwall factor, even when the due process clauses of the state and
federal constitutions are identically worded, other relevant provisions of
the state constitution may indicate that the state constitution should be
interpreted differently. 29 Several sections in the Washington Constitution
directly cite individual rights and privacy as interests that must be
protected by the state constitution. 30 This suggests broader protection for
the interests asserted in substantive due process cases. The first section of
the Washington Constitution states that "all political power is inherent in
the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual
rights."'' No equivalent federal provision exists, although the Ninth
Amendment does contain some similar language.3 2 In addition, article I,
section 7 of the Washington Constitution explicitly protects individual
privacy interests, providing that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."'33 The
language in this provision has led Washington courts to hold that
Washington more stringently protects individuals from search and
seizure than does the parallel Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.' This explicit focus on protecting individual rights in the
127. Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
128. See supra notes 14 and 124 and accompanying text.
129. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
130. See Wash. Const. art I, §§ 1, 7.
131. Wash. Const. art I, § 1. In fact, the title of the first article in the Washington State
Constitution is "Declaration of Rights." Wash. Const. art I.
132. See U.S. Const. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). It should be noted, however, that
although this provision in the Washington Constitution has a place of particular prominence in the
document, the Washington Supreme Court has been reluctant on at least one occasion to grant any
independent substantive relief under this provision alone. See, e.g., State v. Crediford, 130 Wash. 2d
747, 751-52, 927 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1996) (refusing to invalidate drunk driving statute on premise
that it exceeds police power and thus violates article I, section 1 of Washington State Constitution).

133. Wash. Const. art I, § 7.
134. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 76, 917 P.2d 563, 570-71 (1996) (finding
warrantless search of defendant's truck after initial inventory search unconstitutional); City of Seattle
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Washington Constitution warrants a broader reading of the state's due
process clause because the touchstone of due process is protecting

individuals against arbitrary government actions.'35
The third and fourth factors-state constitutional and common law
history and pre-existing state law -are not particularly enlightening in
the due process area. In drafting article I, section 3 of the Washington
Constitution, the convention simply mimicked the language in the U.S.
and Oregon Constitutions without serious debate or discussion.' 37
Notably, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution represents a
federal restriction on the plenary powers of the states. 31 States reinforce
this protection of individual rights when they enact parallel provisions in
their own constitutions. Early Washington cases are ambiguous,
describing individual liberties broadly and restricting permissible state

intervention, but occasionally also mimicking
much of the U.S. Supreme
39

Court's early deference to the legislature.
Under the fifth factor-structural differences between the U.S.
Constitution and state constitution' 4 -- one considers that the U.S.
Constitution grants enumerated powers, whereas the state constitution
limits the otherwise plenary power of the state.' 4 ' This factor will always
42
favor an independent state interpretation.

v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 281-82, 868 P.2d 134, 145 (1994) (finding warrants authorizing
inspection of buildings for code violations pursuant to city's proactive enforcement program invalid
as unconstitutional searches); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
135. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,123(1889).
136. Id.
137. See Journalof Washington State ConstitutionalConvention 1889, 495-96 (B. Rosenow ed.
1962); see also Arthur S. Beardsley, Notes on the Sources ofthe ConstitutionofState of Washington,
1889-1939, University of Washington School of Law (1939).
138. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948).
139. Compare Karasek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 425-26, 61 P. 33, 36 (1900) (holding that police
power to regulate land is limited to nuisance prevention), and State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 428,
30 P. 729, 730 (1892) (noting general rule that "all the personal liberty possibly consistent with the
general welfare is conceded to the individual"), with Territory v. Ah Lim, I Wash. 156, 158-59,
24 P. 588, 588 (1890) (adopting Justice Marshall's proposition in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810), that courts should be highly cautious in invalidating legislation).
140. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 62,720 P.2d at 812.
141. Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776,789-90,940 P.2d 610,611 (1997).
142. Id.
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The sixth criteria-matters of particular state interest or local
concern143-supports an argument for adopting a new substantive due
process test. The regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and
historically a matter of local concern. 1" Individual interests related to
those issues should be protected by a state due process analysis that
responds to these local concerns. In addition, states can and should
provide more protection of individual rights than the baseline protection
1 45
the federal Constitution affords.
Assessing the Gunwall test as a whole, sufficient justification exists
for Washington courts to depart from the federal substantive due process
analysis and adopt an independent test under the Washington
Constitution. The overall textual and structural differences between the
U.S. and Washington State Constitutions strongly favor an independent
interpretation of the Washington due process clause.
C.

Washington Should Create an IndependentAnalysis Because the
FederalSubstantive Due ProcessTest Has FundamentalFlaws

The federal substantive due process test is fundamentally flawed in
several ways. First, because the strict scrutiny and rational relationship
tests are at opposite ends of the spectrum of review, the preliminary
characterization of an interest as fundamental or not fundamental is
crucial. Second, because this categorization is so critical, the description
of the asserted interest gets manipulated to justify fitting the interest into
the desired category. Third, in light of the Supreme Court's restrictive
view of fundamental rights, many important interests receive the rational
relationship test's minimal protection.
1.

Strict Scrutiny Is Too Stringent, but RationalRelation Is
Too Deferential

A disconcerting problem with the two-tiered federal test for
substantive due process violations is that it is not really a "test" at all.
Whether an individual interest is categorized as fundamental or non143. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
144. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985)
(holding that federal regulations governing collection of blood plasma from paid donors did not
preempt local ordinances).
145. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the ProtectionofIndividual Rights, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489,504 (1977).
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fundamental decides the result.'4 6 The rational relationship test consists
' Because of
of "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."147
its highly deferential quality, rational review has been dubbed the "hands
off" test.'48 Meanwhile, strict scrutiny is difficult to overcome. 49 Such a
categorical approach eliminates all but the most cursory judicial
consideration of the important state and individual interests at stake. In
most cases, the "fundamental/non-fundamental"
categorization
determines the result before these interests are even examined.
2.

The Two-Tiered Test Createsan Artificial and Contorted
Definition ofRights

Because the success or failure of a substantive due process claim
hinges almost entirely upon the initial categorization of an asserted right
as fundamental or not, the definition of those rights is contorted to justify
placing the asserted interest into one category or the other. Seeley v.
State.5 exemplifies this phenomenon. Essentially, Mr. Seeley requested
that marijuana be placed on Schedule II of controlled substances so that
patients, particularly those with terminal cancer, may be prescribed leaf
marijuana by their doctors in order to alleviate some of the debilitating
side effects of chemotherapy. The majority, however, defined Mr.
Seeley's interest as "the right to smoke marijuana,"'' thus encompassing
recreational as well as medicinal use.' The court may have employed
this loose analysis to minimize Mr. Seeley's asserted interest and justify
application of the rational relation standard.
The dissent described Mr. Seeley's interest on a more abstract
ideological level. In Justice Sanders's view, Mr. Seeley asserted
"personal concerns of bodily autonomy coupled with a personal desire to

146. See supra Part LC.
147. Galloway, supra note 16, at 645 (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1972)).
148. See id. (citing Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw, 583, 462 (1991)); see also Jonathan
Thompson, The Washington Constitution'sProhibitionon Special Privilegesand Immunities: Real
Bite for "Equal Protection" Review of Regulatory Legislation?, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1247, 1259
(1960).
149. See supraPart I.A.2.
150. 132 Wash. 2d 776, 940 P.2d 604 (1997).
151. Id. at 792, 940 P.2d at 612.
152. See supranote 88.
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mitigate if not alleviate needless physical suffering,"' 53 and an "interest
to inhale or ingest any substance to relieve his agony."'" 4 The disparity
between how the majority and dissent defined Mr. Seeley's interest
demonstrates the inherent tension that arises when the categorization of
an interest is so pivotal to the outcome of a substantive due process
challenge.'55
The definitional problem arising in substantive due process
jurisprudence is a product of forcing liberty interests into two arbitrary
categories. Such important interests as determining the time and manner
of one's death or gaining palliative relief from one's suffering do not fit
neatly into the two simple categories of fundamental and nonfundamental rights. Instead, such interests lie along a continuum, and a
due process analysis designed to protect this variety of interests must be
responsive to this range of personal rights.
3.

The CurrentTest Failsto Ensure Fairnessand Protectionof the
Individual From OverbroadState Regulation

Because under the deferential rational relationship test courts rarely
protect individual rights from state infringement, substantive due process
is virtually meaningless for any right not deemed "fundamental." With
the recent backlash against expansive views of fundamental rights,'56
many important, but not "fundamental," liberty interests lack Fourteenth
Amendment protection. These interests fall through the chasm between
"the virtual rubber-stamp of truly minimal review" and "the virtual
death-blow of truly strict scrutiny."''

153. Seeley, 132 Wash. 2d at 822-23, 940 P.2d at 627 (Sanders, ., dissenting).
154. Id. at 831, 940 P.2d at 631 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
155. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), provides another example. The U.S. Supreme
Court described the proposed interest at issue in Bowers as the "right to engage in homosexual
sodomy." Id. at 191. A strong dissent, however, characterized the asserted interests as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man, namely the right to be left
alone." Id. at 199 (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
156. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text
157. Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 1089 (Ist ed. 1978) ("[Ihe all-or-nothing
choice between minimum rationality and strict scrutiny ill-suits the broad range of situations arising
under the equal protection clause, many of which are best dealt with neither through the virtual
rubber-stamp of truly minimal review nor through the virtual death-blow of truly strict scrutiny, but
through methods more sensitive to the risks of injustice than the former and yet less blind to the
needs of government flexibility than the latter.").
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The current bifurcated due process analysis effectively denies
protection to such important interests as maintaining privacy in sexual
relations,'58 determining the time and manner of one's death," 9 and
acquiring palliative relief for the debilitating side effects of
chemotherapy."6 When courts have subjected these important interests to
the rational relationship test, any armor against state interference has
disappeared.' 6 '
The right to receive the most effective treatment for the side-effects of
chemotherapy cannot be discounted as an insignificant interest. Mr.
Seeley's interest touches upon issues of privacy similar to those
described in Casey as "a person's most basic decisions about.., bodily
integrity.' ' 62 Even federal courts have acknowledged the importance of
this type of interest. Critical to the Court in Roe and Casey was the fact
that the abortion decision had profound and deeply personal
consequences for the woman's life. 63 Mr. Seeley's personal suffering
consumed his daily life and perhaps had more profound and immediate
effects than even a woman's decision to abort a pregnancy. Furthermore,
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority in Glucksberg in part
because she believed that terminally ill patients had a right to receive
palliative relief from their suffering "even when doing so would hasten
their deaths."'"

Courts often cite deference to the legislature as a reason for not

protecting these interests. 165 There is no logical reason for this deference
in Washington with regard to such personal matters as obtaining
158. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
159. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
160. See Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776,940 P.2d 604 (1997).
161. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258.
162. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
163. Id at 851; Roev. Wade,410 U.S. 113,153 (1973).
164. 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In sum, there is no need to address the
question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief
from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives. There is no dispute that
dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would
hasten their deaths.").
165. See, e.g., Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 640, 689 n.35, 935 P.2d 555, 580 n.35
(1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wash. 2d 523, 534, 520 P.2d 162, 169 (1974))
("This unfortunate history of the due process clause in the United States Supreme Court presents to
this court a sobering lesson in the necessity for judicial deference to the legislature in the exercise of
its police power to accomplish economic regulation.").
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palliative relief when Washington courts are so much more willing to

question legislative prerogatives in areas such as land use regulation.'"
The disparity of judicial treatment between property interests and
personal privacy interests is unjustifiable.
D.

Washington Should Adopt a DefinitionalBalancingTest

Washington should adopt a test that provides protection more
sensitive to the importance of the individual interest asserted. This goal
could be met by using a definitional balancing test in which courts
analyze substantive due process issues by first identifying the state and
individual interests implicated by the case, and then construing a rule of
general applicability that either explicitly or implicitly assigns weight or
value to the competing interests. 67 This methodology was used in Roe v.
Wade. 68 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed the competing
state and individual interests implicated in the regulation of abortion.' 69
After balancing these interests, the court developed a general rule to be
applied to all future cases raising similar issues of state impediment of
access to abortion."7

166. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. It is true that property is an enumerated right
in the text of the Constitution. Stepping away from a formalist perspective, however, it seems that a
person's interest in his or her own body should be even more vital, and receive even greater
protection, than his or her interest in land.
167. Balancing has been suggested in a line of cases stemming from Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also suggested a
sliding scale approach in an equal protection context. Rather than forcing rights into discrete
categories, Justice Marshall would concentrate on the relative importance of the interest to the
individual versus the asserted state interest. See Crump, supra note 45, at 911 (citing Thomas C.
Grey, The Constitutionas Scripture,37 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1984)). In fact, Crump suggests that in
many cases, the U.S. Supreme Court really has been balancing individual and state interests all
along. Id. at 911-12.
168. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
169. Id. at 153-54.
170. The rule generated in Roe states:
A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a
life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without
recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and
its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician.
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For guidance in balancing the relevant interests, the court should look
to the factors employed by the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying.7 '
and later adopted by a Washington court of appeals in City of Seattle v.
McConahy.7 a These include (1) the importance of the various state
interests, both in general and in the factual context of the case; (2) the
manner in which those interests are furthered by the state law or
regulation; (3) the importance of the liberty interest both in itself and in
the context in which it is being exercised; (4) the extent to which that
interest is burdened by the challenged state action; and (5) the
consequences of upholding or overturning the statute or regulation. 73
Acceptance of a balancing test does not necessarily mean a return to
the Lochner era of excessive judicial invalidation of legislative acts.
McConahy was the first Washington case to employ the balancing test
from Compassion in Dying. McConahy, a challenge to the Seattle
ordinance forbidding sitting on a sidewalk, involved assertions of
significant rights to autonomy and freedom of movement."' The court,
however, upheld the ordinance as constitutional even under a balancing
test.'76 A balancing test when properly employed is self-limiting; state
regulations would only be invalidated when the government interest is
outweighed by the individual liberty interest. Given the substantial state
interests in public health, safety, and welfare, this balancing would often
favor the state and certainly would not result in a sudden flood of
invalidation.'
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of
human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.
Id. at 164-65.
171. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. 86 W'ash. App. 557,565,937 P.2d 1133, 1138 (1997).
173. Compassionin Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
174. See supra Part I.C.
175. 86 Wash. at 564, 566, 937 P.2d at 1138, 1139.
176. Id. at 567, 937 P.2d at 1139.
177. Of course, this new test does not threaten to require previously protected rights, such as a
woman's right to access abortion, to re-establish themselves under the new test. Rights protected
under the federal constitution would continue to be a floor below which state protection could not
fall. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,299-300 (1982).
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A definitional balancing test would also avoid some of the uncertainty
inherent in ad hoc balancing. The U.S. Supreme Court has sought to
avoid "complex balancing of competing interests in every case."' 78 Under
a definitional balancing test, the balancing of interests would occur only
when novel substantive due process issues arise. Once the interests have
been balanced and a general rule of constitutional law is constructed, that
rule will apply to all subsequent cases involving the same right without a
need for further balancing.
It is possible that the same manipulation of definitions would occur in
a balancing test as in the existing bifurcated substantive due process
analysis but with lesser effects. In a balancing test, the court could
describe an asserted interest in a way that makes the interest seem more
or less vital in an effort to tip the scales. However, the effect of this
manipulation should not be nearly as severe as it is with the two-tiered
test. Under the bifurcated analysis, the effort to shoehorn the liberty
interest into either the fundamental or non-fundamental category
becomes vital to the outcome and can result in a severe contortion of the
interest. With a balancing test, the fact that the level of protection
afforded to an interest lies on a continuum renders the consequences of
the definition less significant.
V.

A BALANCING TEST WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE
OUTCOME OF SEELEY V STATE

Fairly applying the proposed definitional balancing test would have
changed the outcome of Seeley v. State because the McConahy factors
embodied in the proposed test weigh in favor of restructuring state
regulation of medicinal marijuana in a manner less burdensome to the
legitimate interests of the terminally ill in obtaining palliative relief. The
first factor-the importance of the state interest-is of some weight;
however, the significance of this state interest may not be as strong in the
case of a terminally ill individual. The second factor-the manner in
which the state interest is furthered by state law-seems to weigh against
the state. A total ban on all medicinal use of marijuana is not well
tailored to the named state interests. A much less restrictive and better
suited solution would be to limit the legalization of marijuana to
prescriptive use, and to require extensive testing of the side-effects of
marijuana before releasing the drug to patients who are not terminally ill
178. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258,2268 (1997).

Washington Substantive Due Process
with cancer. Ultimately, if no problems are discovered in testing,
marijuana might be prescribed for illnesses such as glaucoma and nonterminal cancer.
The third factor-the importance of the liberty interest-looks to Mr.
Seeley's significant interest in obtaining palliative relief. Mr. Seeley
demonstrated that he suffered from great pain, nausea and vomiting, and
that no other form of medication had provided him adequate relief. 7 9
These are matters of bodily integrity and deeply personal issues
concerning private suffering, interests that should be among those most
strongly protected from unreasonable intrusion by the state.
The fourth factor is the extent to which the individual interest is
burdened by the challenged state action. In Mr. Seeley's case, the
absolute prohibition on the one substance that provided him palliative
relief was unquestionably a great burden upon this interest.
The fifth factor is the effect of upholding or overturning the statute or
regulation. Overturning the placement of marijuana on Schedule I would
not require leaving the substance entirely free from regulation. A more
narrowly tailored regulation could be enacted that would serve the state
interest in controlling drugs, while imposing a lesser burden upon the
terminally ill. The state lists PCP, angel dust, cocaine, opium, and
morphine for prescriptive use; 80 it hardly seems unreasonable to extend
this status to medicinal marijuana.
Balancing all the factors, a court could find that Mr. Seeley's
individual interest outweighs the state interest in broadly prohibiting
marijuana use. The court would then be left to fashion a rule of general
applicability that would apply should this issue arise again. For example,
terminally ill cancer patients could have a right to obtain medicinal
marijuana under a doctor's prescription if they could establish (1) they
are undergoing treatment for terminal cancer, and (2) their doctors certify
that no other medication provides adequate palliative relief for the sideeffects of their treatment.
Regardless of the outcome reached by a court, a test better gauged to
the weight of the individual interest at stake and more sensitive to the
risks of injustice would have been applied. An important individual
interest would have been given a greater opportunity to overcome undue
state infringement.
179. Seeley v. State, 132 Wash. 2d 776,781,940 P.2d 604,606 (1997).
180. Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.206 (1997).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Seeley v. State presented an excellent opportunity for Washington to
finally detach its substantive due process analysis from the federal
approach. The federal two-tiered approach to substantive due process
challenges justifiably has come under heavy attack from both jurists and
scholars. 1 ' Washington courts also have expressed their discomfort with
the federal approach. In City of Seattle v. McConahy, the Washington
Court of Appeals seemed ready to adopt a test that balances competing
state and individual interests.'8 2 Washington was leaning toward a more
liberal and less artificial analysis until the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg.'83 The Supreme Court of
Washington mechanically followed the Glucksberg analysis in Seeley.'"
It was precisely at this juncture that the Supreme Court of Washington
should have chosen to depart from the federal approach to substantive
due process. Instead, the Supreme Court of Washington should have
continued on the path begun by the court of appeals in McConahy.
Adopting a balancing test is vital to the view that substantive due process
is designed to protect individual liberty.'85 The suggested balancing test
avoids the deferential rubber-stamp of rational relationship by giving a
level of protection proportional to the importance of the interest on a
sliding scale that is more fair than the bifurcated federal analysis. In fight

18 1. See supra Part V.C1.
182. 86 Wash. App. 557,564-65,937 P.2d 1133, 1138 (1997).
183. 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
184. 132 Wash. 2d 776,940 P.2d 604.
185. "If we view the Supreme Court's substantive due process doctrine as a vehicle for protecting
personal autonomy, the principled application of this doctrine requires a consideration of the
interests of the individual and the competing governmental interests in regulation." Daniel 0.
Conkle, The Second Death ofSubstantiveDue Process,62 Ind.L.J. 215, 235 (1987).
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of the current political climate, the Supreme Court of Washington is
likely to be faced with the issue of substantive due process and medicinal
use of marijuana again in the near future.'86 At that time, the Court
should apply a test more sensitive to the importance of the individual
interest at risk.

186. Washington Initiative 685, a medical marijuana initiative, was voted down in November
1997, but State Senator Jeanne Kohl is currently sponsoring a similar bill: the Washington State
Medical Marijuana Act, Senate Bill 6271. The "Ralph Seeley Medical Marijuana Initiative" and
another draft of the November 1997 initiative are being circulated. Hunter T. George, Medicinal
MarijuanaInitiatives Will Go to Voters Again, News Trib. (Wash.), Feb. 7, 1998, at B3. California
and Arizona legalized marijuana for medicinal purposes in 1994. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Battle of the
Drug Warriors,Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 13, 1998, at D9. Virginia has permitted the use of
marijuana to treat glaucoma since 1979. State, Local Votes to Decide ControversialIssues Today,
Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1997, at A24. Initiatives for the November 1998 ballot have been circulated in
Florida, Maine, and Alaska. See The FDA and 'MedicinalMarijuana, Tampa Trib., June 1, 1998 at
6; Paul Van Stanbrouck, MarijuanaStill Divides California, Christian Science Monitor, May 4,
1998, at 1; Joshua L. Weinstein, Petitionsfor Marijuana Vote Rejected, Portland Press Herald,
Apr. 1, 1998, at lB.
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